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Evidence
by Joseph B. Harvey*
On January 1, 1967, the California Evidence Code began
to govern trials held in California courtS.1 Because of the
delays necessarily incident to litigation, the appellate courts
were not called upon to review trials held under the new
rules in significant numbers until 1968. With the 1968 decisions, however, the impact of the Code upon California practice has become fairly apparent. At the same time, the
courts have continued to develop rules of evidence designed
to implement the various procedural guarantees found in
the Constitution of the United States, and some of these courtdeveloped rules have had significant effect, particularly in
criminal cases.
'" B.A. 1949, Occidental College.
LL. B. J 952, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law. Partner:
Herrick, Gross, Mansfield, Harvey, and
Miller. Member, California State Bar.
1959-67, Assistant Executive Secretary
of the California Law Revision Commission, participating in the Commis-
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sion's formulation of the California
Evidence Code.
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Meanwhile, the legislature was content to make few, and
only minor, changes in the statutory law of evidence. Thus
the principal arena for securing changes in evidence law
has shifted from the legislature to the courts.

Legislative Developments of 1968
The 1968 session of the California Legislature added four
sections to the Evidence Code, none of major significance.
Chapter 1375 of the statutes of 1968 authorized the formation of professional service corporations by lawyers and
physicians to perform legal and medical services. 2 As part
of this legislation, sections 954 and 994 of the Evidence Code
were amended to provide that the attorney-client relationship
and the physician-patient relationship exists between the law
corporation and its client and the medical corporation and
its patient for the purposes of the respective communication
privileges.
By Chapter 1122 of the statutes of 1968, the legislature
also added sections 1157 and 1158 to the Evidence Code.
Section 1157 provides that the proceedings and records of
neither a hospital medical staff committee having the responsibility of evaluation and improvement of the quality of care
rendered in the hospital nor a medical review committee of
a local medical society are subject to discovery. No person
in attendance at a meeting of such a committee may be required to testify concerning its proceedings. However, the
privilege created by the section does not apply to statements
made at such a meeting by a party to an action the subject
matter of which was reviewed at the meeting. Nor does it
apply to a meeting if a person serves on a committee reviewing
his own conduct. The privilege is inapplicable, also, in any
action against an insurance carrier for bad faith in refusing
to settle a case within policy limits.
Section 1158 requires licensed medical personnel and licensed hospitals to make available to an attorney for a patient
all of the patient's medical records for inspection and copying
2. See Bus. & Prof. Code
2508,6160-6172.
2
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upon the patient's written authorization. The section may
be invoked though no action has been filed. Thus, an attorney who wants to inspect his client's medical records to see
if there is a basis for a malpractice claim may force disclosure
of such records without filing an action and using the formal
discovery procedures provided in the Code of Civil Procedure.
Judicial Developments of 1968
As in prior years the courts have continued to develop rules
of evidence from the procedural guarantees of the United
States Constitution. The bulk of the appellate cases dealing
with evidence are, therefore, criminal cases. There have
been a few significant noncriminal cases-e.g., those cases
dealing with the parol evidence rule-but almost all of the
significant decisions dealing with evidence have dealt with
criminal matters.
Identification Evidence

The most significant series of cases decided in 1968 were
those dealing with pretrial identification of criminal defendants by their victims and other witnesses. In 1967 the United
States Supreme Court decided that a defendant is entitled to
counsel at a police lineup.3 In People v. Feggans4 the state
supreme court decided that, as a matter of state law, this
rule would be applicable only to police lineups occurring after
June 12, 1967. 4 .1 As to lineups occurring before such time,
3. United States v. Wade, 388
218, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 87 S.Ct.
(1967); Gilbert v. California. 388
263, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 87 S.Ct.
(1967).

U.S.
1926
U.S.
1951

4. 67 Cal.2d 444, 62 Cal. Rptr. 419,
432 P.2d 21 (1967).
4.1. The date thus established is another in a series of dates fixed by the
United States and California Supreme
Courts for determining the applicability
of various constitutional rules of evidence. June 19, 1961-the federal rule
prohibiting admission in state court
trials of evidence obtained by an illegal

search and seizure will be applied only
to cases not final on the date of the decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 84
A.L.R.2d 933 (1961). Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 14 L.Ed.2d 601,
85 S.Ct. 1731 (1965). June 22,1964the federal rule prohibiting admission
of a statement elicited in violation of
the defendant's right to counsel is applicable to trials beginning after the
date of decision in Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct.
1758 (1964); Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U.S. 719, 16 L.Ed.2d 882, 86 S.Ct.
CAL LAW 1969
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a defendant is entitled to attack the procedure if it unfairly
directed the attention of the identifying witness to the particular defendant. 5
The consequences of failure to comply with these constitutional requirements have been spelled out in a number of
cases. In People v. Caruso,51 the defendant was placed with
four men who did not resemble him at all. The defendant
was six feet one inch tall and weighed 238 pounds. He was
1772 (1966). In California, the rule is
applicable to c{{ses I/ot final on the
stated date. People v. Rollins, 65 Cal.
2d 681, 56 Cal. Rptr. 293, 423 P.2d 221
(1967).
April 28, 1965-the federal
rule prohibiting comment upon a defendant's failure to testify will be applied only to cases not {illal on the date
of decision in Griffin v. California. 380
U.S. 609, 14 l.Ed.2d 106, 85 S.C!.
1229 (1965). Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S.
406, 15 L.Ed.2d 453, 86 S.C!. 459
(1966). lillie 13, 1966-the federal rule
prohibiting the admission of statements
elicited during custodial interrogation
without the warning prescribed in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. 16
L.Ed.2d 694,86 S.C!. 1602, 10 A.L.R.
3d 974 (1966) is applicable only in tri{{ls
cOlI/lI/cncillg after the date of the
Miranda decision.
Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 16 L.Ed.2d 882.
86 S.C!. 1772 (1966); People v. Rollins,
65 Cal.2d 681, 56 Cal. Rptr. 293, 423
P.2d 221 (1967). lillie 12, 1967-the
federal rule requiring representation by
counsel at lineups is applicable only to
lilleups occllrring after the date of decision in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 87 S.C!. 1926
(1967) and Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263, 18 L.Ed.2d lIn, 87 S.C!.
1951 (1967). Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 87 S.C!.
I 967 (1967).
The trend of these decisions is toward
a recognition that the court is making
law (as does a legislature), not discovering it. Hence, the courts are be4
CAL LAW 1969
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ginning to establish "effective dates" for
their legislative pronouncements even as
legislatures do. The judicial process is
such, however, that a discrimination
frequently results when "legislation" is
created by a case decision: e.g., a rule
was applied to the lineups in Wade and
Gilbert that was different from the rule
applied to all other lineups occurring
prior to June 12, 1967. Moreover, law
enforcement officials frequently find the
evidence they have obtained is inadmissible because of the violation of rules
they could not know would be applicable.
These problems might be avoided if
the Court would candidly admit that the
federal Constitution does not prescribe
these new evidentia:'y rules-these rules
have been devised by the court as a
means of enforcing the Constitution.
The rules adopted by the court for enforcing the Constitution might then be
set forth in promulgated court rules
with a prescribed effective date. Then
all litigants would be treated equally.
Enforcement officials would not be subject to retroactive rules. Moreover, the
court rule procedure would provide a
needed flexibility should it develop that
any of these new constitutional rules of
evidence are not workable.
5. People v. Caruso, 68 Ca1.2d 183,
65 Cal. Rptr. 336, 436 P.2d 336 (1968).
5.1. 68 Cal.2d 183,65 Cal. Rptr. 336,
436 P.2d 336 (1968). For further discussion of this case, see Collings, CRIMINAL LAW, in this volume.

4
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of Italian descent with a very dark complexion and dark wavy
hair. The other lineup participants were not his size, did not
have dark complexions, and did not have dark wavy hair.
Accordingly, the supreme court determined that the lineup
and identification procedure was grossly unfair to the defendant. The evidence of the lineup was, therefore, inadmissible.
Moreover, the court held that the identifying witness should
not be permitted to identify the defendant in court unless
the people can show on voir dire by clear and convincing
proof that the in-court identification testimony is not tainted
by the unfair pretrial lineup. The people must show that the
in-court identification testimony is based on the original recollection of the appearance of the defendant and not upon a
recollection based on the unfair lineup.6
In People v. Menchaca 7 the victim was face to face with
the actual criminal for but a few seconds. The criminal was
of Mexican extraction. In the lineup, the defendant was the
only Mexican participating. The court found the lineup to
be unfair, and found no evidence in the record to show that
the in-court identification of the defendant was free from
the taint of the unfair lineup. The conviction was reversed.
In People v. HoganS the defendant was the only Negro in
the lineup. This, too, was found to be so unfair as to amount
to a deprivation of due process of law, and the defendant's
conviction was reversed. The trial court was instructed to
exclude any evidence of an in-court identification unless the
people could establish by clear and convincing proof that
the in-court identification was based solely upon the witness's
observations of the accused at the scene of the crime and
not upon the pretrial identification.
In People v. Irvin 9 the identification witness was confronted
at the police station with only the accused persons. There
was no lineup and no exhibition of any person other than
6. See 68 Ca1.2d at 189-191,65 Cal.
Rptr. at 341, 436 P.2d at 341.
7. 264 Cal. App.2d - , 70 Cal. Rptr.
843 (1968). For further discussion of
this case, see Collings, CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE, in this volume.
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8. 264 Cal. App.2d - , 70 Cal.
Rptr. 448 (1968). For further discussian of this case, see Collings, CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE, in this volume.
9. 264 Cal. App.2d - , 70 Cal. Rptr.
892 (\968).
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the suspect. Although the court criticized the practice of
permitting identification by confrontation with only the accused, it nevertheless held that such a confrontation may be
justifiable under exceptional circumstances. The court pointed
out the need for a prompt identification where apprehension
of the suspect immediately follows the crime. Such a prompt
confrontation aids in quickly exonerating the innocent and
discovering the guilty.lO Prompt confrontation may also promote accuracy of identification. The court in Irvin also found
that the in-court identification testimony itself showed that
the prior confrontation had no "priming" effect on the witness.
In People v. Padgitt ll the defendant was identified by one
victim of his crimes from mug shots. He asserted on appeal
that he had the right to have counsel present at the identification. The court of appeal disagreed, holding in accord with
Simmons v. United States 12 that convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification
by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the
photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly
suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification. Finding no unfairness in the
particular instance, the defendant's conviction was affirmed.
In People v. Shannon 13 pictures of the defendant were illegally
taken from his apartment and shown to the victim. The
victim's in-court identification was admitted despite the identification of the defendant from the illegally taken photographs. The court was able to conclude that the in-court
identification of the defendant was independent of the iden10. In People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal.
2d 448, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658
(1963), the court suggested such a single
confrontation as an investigatory technique for determining whether there
was probable cause for arresting a suspect. In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 87 S.C!. 1967
(1967) there is an implication that a
one-on-one identification without the
presence of counsel is prohibited by the
rule announced in Gilbert v. California,
6
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388 U.S. 263, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 87 S.C!.
1951 (1967); for the identification in
Stovall was a one-on-one identification
and was saved by the court's refusal to
apply Gilbert to identifications occurring before June 12, 1967.
11. 264 Cal. App.2d - , 70 Cal. Rptr.
345 (1968).
12. 390 U.S. 377, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247,
88 S.C!. 967 (1968).
13. 256 Cal. App.2d 889, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 491 (1967).
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tification made from the photographs shown to the victim,
because she had been in earnest conversation with the defendant for at least one-half hour at a distance of twelve to fourteen inches, and had great familiarity with his face.
In People v. Douglas14 there was a conflict in the testimony
concerning the circumstances of the lineup. The court pointed
out that, under Evidence Code section 405, the judge is
required to resolve any evidentiary conflict in determining
whether the lineup was unfair. If he determines that the
lineup was unfair, he may still admit the in-court identification
if he determines that the in-court testimony had an independent origin and was not tainted by the unfair pretrial lineup.
If the judge permits the in-court identification, the defendant
may nevertheless offer before the jury such evidence of unfairness as he can produce. This, however, goes to weight rather
than admissibility.14.1
Admissions and Confessions

During 1968 many of the appellate cases dealing with
evidence were concerned with establishing the limits of the
Dorado-Escobedo-Miranda interrogation rules. I5
In Miranda v. Arizona I6 the Supreme Court held that, not
only must a suspect in custody be warned of his constitutional
right to remain silent, but all police questioning must cease
when it appears that the suspect wishes to assert that right and
remain silent. In People v. Fioritto,17 the defendant was
warned and refused to waive his right to remain silent. The
14. 259 Cal. App.2d 694. 66 Cal.
Rptr. 492 (1968).
14.1. See Cal. Evid. Code § 406.
15. See Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S.
436. 16 L.Ed.2d 694. 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10
A.L.R.3d 974 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois. 378 U.S. 478. 12 L.Ed.2d 977. 84
S.Ct. 1758 (1964); People v. Dorado.
62 Cal.2d 338. 42 Cal. Rptr. 169. 398
P.2d 361 (1965). cert. den. 381 U.S. 937.
14 L.Ed.2d 702. 85 S.Ct. 1765. The
Dorado-Escobedo rules are applicable
to those cases where the appeal was not

final before June 22. 1964. The additional criteria established by Miranda
are to be applied to trials beginning
after June 13. 1966. People v. Rollins.
65 Cal.2d 681. 56 Cal. Rptr. 293. 423
P.2d 221 (1967).
16. 384 U.S. 436. 16 L.Ed.2d 694.
86 S.C!. 1602. 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966).
17. 68 Cal.2d 714.68 Cal. Rptr. 817.
441 P .2d 625 (1968). For further discussion of this case. see Collings. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE. in this
volume.
CAL LAW 1969
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police then confronted the defendant with his accomplices,
who had confessed and implicated the defendant. After a
heated argument between the defendant and his accomplices,
the accomplices were taken away and the defendant was again
asked if he would waive his right to remain silent. The
defendant then signed a waiver and confessed. The court
held that his interrogation should have ceased upon his first
refusal to waive his right to remain silent. The confession
was obtained, therefore, in violation of the Miranda standard
and was inadmissible.
In People v. Matthews I8 the defendant solicited an interview
with the police "to clear things up." Previously, he had been
given several warnings as to his constitutional rights. None
of the warnings, however, was wholly adequate under Miranda
to inform the defendant of his right to the presence of his
counsel at the interview. The interview was conducted in
question and answer form and it elicited several highly
incriminating statements. The people sought to avoid exclusion of the defendant's statements on the ground that they
were volunteered and, hence, Miranda was inapplicable. The
court held that the interrogating officer, in a volunteered interview, must remain neutral. Otherwise, the officer may "elicit
more incriminating matter than the suspect would have volunteered." Where the police role in the interview is not
passive, where the police lead the direction of the interview
through their questioning, they must give the M il'anda warning
despite the fact that the defendant's participation in the interview is volunteered. If the warning is not given, the information elicited is inadmissible despite the defendant's voluntary
participation in the interview.
Matthews also held that it is essential to warn the suspect
of his Miranda rights at the outset of each interrogation. 19
This statement is in conflict with at least two other appellate
cases. In both People v. Long20 and in People v. Sievers/
18.
Rptr.
19.
Rptr.
8
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264 Cal. App.2d - , 70 Cal.
756 (1968).
264 Cal. App.2d at - , 70 Cal.
at 765.

20. 263 Cal. App.2d 540, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 698 (1968).
1. 255 Cal. App.2d 34, 62 Cal. Rptr.
841 (1967).

CAL LAW 1969
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it was held that one warning is sufficient. It is not necessary
to give an additional warning at each interview. The
Matthews court relied upon the Supreme Court's statement in
Miranda that "whatever the background of the person interrogated, a warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual
knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time.,,2
Moreover, Miranda holds that there must be an affirmative
waiver of the suspect's constitutional rights before the questioning can proceed. 3
The Miranda standards were not applicable to the Sievers
triaV They were, however, applicable to the trial in People
v. Long. s Nevertheless, the court in Long followed Sievers
in ruling that one warning is sufficient. 6 The Matthews reading of Miranda appears, however, to be correct. 7 Accordingly, police officers and prosecuting officials should be reluctant to place too much weight on the Sievers and Long opinions. Admissibility will be assured only if a warning is given
each time governmental representatives undertake to obtain
information from a suspect in custody through an interrogation process. Under Matthews, such a warning should be
given whenever questioning is carried on even though the
suspect solicited the interview.
The courts have also been concerned with the definition of a
custodial interrogation. A conversation in a police station
is not necessarily a custodial interrogation if the defendant
is under the impression that he can leave at any time. s The
2. 384 U.s. at 469, 16 L.Ed.2d at
720, 86 S.Ct. at - , 10 A.L.R.3d at
1008.
3. "[AJ valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the
accused after warnings are given or
simply from the fact that a confession
was in fact eventually obtained . . . .
'Presuming waiver from a silent record
is impermissible. The record must
show, or there must be an allegation
and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969

offer. Anything less is not waiver.'''
384 U.S. at 475, 16 L.Ed.2d at 724, 86
S.Ct. at - , 10 A.L.R.3d at 1012.
4. See 255 Cal. App.2d at 37, 62
Cal. Rptr. at 843.
5. 263 Cal. App.2d at 544-545, 69
Cal. Rptr. at 701.
6. 263 Cal. App.2d at 545, 69 Cal.
Rptr. at 701.
7. See footnote 2, supra and accompanying text.
8. People v. Gioviannini, 260 Cal.
App.2d 597, 67 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1968).
CAL LAW 1969
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emphasis is not on the interrogator's subjective intent, but
on whether the defendant reasonably believes his freedom of
movement is restricted by pressures of physical authority.
Where the defendant is in custody on a charge other than that
under investigation, an interrogation conducted by the usual
question and answer method is a custodial interrogation and
the Miranda warning must be given if the information elicited is to be used against the defendant. 9 However, even
though a person is in custody, a custodial officer can ask him
a neutral question such as "what happened?" upon arriving at
the scene of some incident in the prison where the question
is asked as part of the general investigation to determine
whether a crime has been committed. 1o If the conduct of
the individual being questioned is itself the subject matter
of the inquiry, however, it seems likely that any answers will
be inadmissible unless the Miranda warning was given. l l
In People v. Hernandez 12 the court concluded that the
routine questions asked by a booking officer at the jail do
not amount to the kind of custodial interrogation against
which the Miranda rule is intended as a guard. Thus, in
Hernandez the booking officer at the jail was permitted to
testify to the birthdate given by the defendant at the time of
his booking even though the Miranda warning requirement
was not met before the booking questions were asked. The
defendant's birthdate was important in the case to identify
him as the same person referred to in a birth certificate. The
birth certificate, in turn, was relevant to show the defendant
to be over 21, an essential element of the crime chargedviolation of Health and Safety Code section 11532 (sale of
marijuana to a minor).
Miranda does not apply to statements made by a defendant
in custody to a probation officer engaged in preparing the
defendant's pre-sentence reporL 13 Miranda does not require

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/4

9. People v. Woodberry, 265 Cal.
App.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1968);
Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1,
20 L.Ed.2d 381, 88 S.Ct. 1503 (1968).

11. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S.
J, 20 L.Ed.2d 381, 88 S.Ct. 1503 (1968).
12. 263 Cal. App.2d 242, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 448 (1968).

10. People v. Mercer, 257 Cal. App.
2d 244, 64 Cal. Rptr. 86 J (1968).
10
CAL LAW 1969

13. People v. Smith, 259 Cal. App.2d
8 J 4, 66 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1968).
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a warning before a suspect is asked to perform an act such
as the giving of a handwriting exemplar. 14 A suspect not in
custody need not be given a Miranda warning before he talks
to a person who, unknown to the suspect, is acting as a police
agent.15 Similarly, a person who is unknowingly in the presence of police officers need not be given a Miranda warning
before he is permitted to perform a criminal act. 16
A reading of the many cases dealing with confessions and
a defendant's rights under custodial interrogation leads one
to believe that the enactment of the Evidence Code may have
solved some of the procedural problems that could have been
presented to the appellate courts under the former law. In
People v. MidkifJI7 it is pointed out that the judge alone
must decide whether the Miranda-Dorado warning requirements were met. The enactment of section 405 of the Evidence Code has forestalled any contention that compliance
with the Miranda warning requirements must be decided by
the jury as well as the judge. As the warning cases shade
imperceptibly into the coerced confession cases, it would have
been extremely difficult to determine which confession cases
should be decided by the judge alone and which confession
cases would be submitted to the jury. By providing a uniform admissibility procedure, the Code has permitted the
courts to confine the jury in all cases to its basic responsibility
of determining guilt or innocence, withholding from it the
additional responsibility of determining the admissibilty of
evidence.

Co-conspirators' Confessions
In People v. Spriggs I8 the California Supreme Court created
a new exception to the hearsay rule for declarations against
penal interest-Le., statements that are so self-incriminating
14. People v. Sesslin, 68 Cal.2d 418,
67 Cal. Rptr. 409, 439 P.2d 321 (1968).
15. People v. Ragen, 262 Cal. App.2d
392, 68 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1968).
16. People v. Marinos, 260 Cal. App.
2d 735, 67 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1968).

17. 262 Cal App.2d 734, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 866 (1968).
18. 60 Cal.2d 868, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841,
389 P.2d 377 (1964).

CAL LAW 1969
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that it is unlikely the speaker would have made them if they
were not true. In that case, the declaration against penal
interest was offered by the defendant. The rule of People v.
Spriggs was codified in section 1230 of the Evidence Code,
subject to the qualification that the declarant be shown to
be unavailable as a witness.
In People v. Aranda 19 the court held that the confession
of one codefendant identifying a codefendant as another participant in the crime cannot be admitted in the trial of the
identified codefendant unless the identification can be successfully deleted from the confession. If the identifying information cannot be successfully deleted, the trials of the codefendants must be severed. In Bruton v. United StateiO the United
States Supreme Court adopted the Aranda rule as a requirement of federal due process. Aranda and Bruton both considered an instruction to the jury-permitting use of the confession against the confessor only-an inadequate protection
for the codefendant. Roberts v. RusselF made the rule in
Bruton retroactive.
Unfortunately, there has been little discussion of the relationship between the Aranda-Bruton rule and the hearsay
exception for declarations against penal interest. One may
hypothesize that the rationale underlying Aranda is that, since
the portion of a confession that implicates another is not incriminatory as to the declarant, it is not against his penal
interest. Therefore, the portion of a confession implicating
another is not sufficiently against the penal interest of the
declarant to meet the demands of the exception to the hearsay
rule. If this analysis is correct, the portion of the confession
that implicates the declarant himself should be admissible
to prove the declarant's own participation in the crime whenever relevant in the trial of another. This could be relevant
to the guilt of another in a number of contexts. For example,
if the declarant and defendant were co-conspirators, the
19. 63 Cal.2d 518,47 Cal. Rptr. 353,
407 P.2d 265 (1965).
20. 391 U.S. 123, 20 L.Ed.2d 476,
88 S.C!. 1620 (1968).
12
CAL LAW 1969
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1. 392 U.S. 293, 20 L.Ed.2d 1100,
88 S.C!. 1921 (1968).
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confessor's statement might be used to prove what the confessor had done in the course of the conspiracy. In a prosecution for receiving stolen goods, the thief's confession that
he stole the goods might be used to prove that the goods were
stolen by the thief and not by some third person.
This rationale and analysis has yet to be tested in the courts.
In Bruton, the United States Supreme Court suggested that
one reason for the rule requiring separate trials is that, where
the confessor does not take the stand, his confession cannot
be tested by cross-examination. This, perhaps, violates the
defendant's right of confrontation. 2 This rationale would
prevent the introduction in a defendant's separate trial of a
declaration against penal interest made by a co-conspirator,
for the co-conspirator's privilege against self-incrimination
would preclude effective cross-examination. But, this rationale, too, would exclude a considerable amount of hearsay traditionally thought to be admissible against criminal defendants.
For example, in People v. Moralei it was held that the Aranda
rule does not require separate trials when the statement of
the declarant is admissible under Evidence Code section 1223
as a statement of a co-conspirator made in the course and in
furtherance of a conspiracy. Where the declarant does not
take the stand, however, his statement, even though made to
further a conspiracy and admissible under the traditional
hearsay exception, cannot be tested by cross-examination. The
Bruton rationale, thus, would strike at the admissibility of
this statement. It would also strike at the admissibility of
dying declarations,4 for it is inherent in the nature of the
exception that the declarant is unavailable for cross-examination. Statements under these latter exceptions can be far
more devastating to a defendant than a declaration against
penal interest implicating only the declarant, for statements
of a co-conspirator and dying declarations are admissible
though they specifically identify the defendant.
The real problem here is how far the legislature and the
2. 391 U.s. at 136. See 20 L.Ed.2d
at 485, 88 S.Ct. at - .

3. 263 Cal. App.2d 368, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 402 (1968).
4. See Cal. Evid. Code § 1242.
CAL LAW 1969
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courts can go in creating exceptions to the hearsay rule. s
The question is whether the hearsay rule was frozen upon
the adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791 or whether it can
be permitted to develop. Heretofore, it has always been
supposed that the right of confrontation has not precluded
the development of new hearsay exceptions. 6 The recent
emphasis of the Supreme Courts of this state and of the
United States upon the right of confrontation in hearsay contexts may foreshadow some rolling back of the hearsay rule
insofar as the exceptions to it may be invoked against the
defendant in a criminal case.
Perhaps, because of the right of confrontation, section 1230
of the Evidence Code states an exception that may be invoked
by a defendant in a criminal case but not by the people.
There is language in Bruton that suggests that this may be
the case. Nevertheless, there is no holding to that effect at
the present time, and so far as this author knows the question
has not as yet been presented to the California appellate courts.
Until the question is decided, therefore, it is at least still arguable that Aranda and section 1230 are reconcilable and that
the portion of a confession that implicates only the declarant
himself is admissible as a declaration against penal interest
when the declarant is unavailable as a witness.
Cases dealing with the Aranda rule during 1968 have held
that it does not apply to statements of a co-conspirator, made
in the course of the conspiracy, that are admissible under
section 1223 of the Evidence Code. 7 The Aranda rule does
not require a separate trial when the evidence taken from
the codefendant is physical evidence, and not a statement or
confession. s Noncompliance with the Aranda rule does not

5. This problem also arises in other
contexts which will be discussed infra.
6. "The exceptions are not . . .
static, but may be enlarged from time
to time if there is no material departure
from the reason for the general rule."
Cardozo, J., in Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97 at 107, 78 L.Ed. 674 at
14
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679, 54 S.Ct. 330 at - , 90 A.L.R. 575
at 580, overruled on other grounds 378
U.S. 1, 12 L.Ed.2d 653, 84 S.Ct. 1489
(1934).
7. People v. Morales, 263 Cal. App.
2d 368, 69 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1968).
8. People v. King, 255 Cal. App.2d
551, 63 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1967).
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require a reversal when the defendant himself has made an
admissible confession which completely shatters his own case. 9
Prior Statements of Witnesses; Former Testimony

The Evidence Code has four sections-1235, 1236, 1237
and 1238-dealing with statements made by trial witnesses
prior to the commencement of the trial. Sections 1290-1292
of the Code deal with testimony given at previous trials by
witnesses who are not available to testify at the current trial.
The cases dealing with these sections during 1968 have considered the problems somewhat interrelated, and they will
be considered together here.
Under the Code, a prior inconsistent statement of a witness
is admissible though he has not given damaging testimony
against the party introducing the inconsistent statement. 10 In
People v. lohnson ll the supreme court considered the application of this exception to a criminal defendant. The court
found that it violates the criminal defendant's right to confront
the witnesses against him, and is thus unconstitutional if so
applied. The court developed its ruling from cases where
there had been an attempt to introduce a pretrial statement
of a person who was not available for cross-examination at
the trial. But the court reasoned that a right of cross-examination, to be meaningful, must be a right to cross-examine at
the time of the statements that are being offered as substantive evidence.
The court criticized the rationale of the Law Revision Commission in recommending section 1235, which stated "the
dangers against which the hearsay rule is designed to protect
are largely nonexistent. The declarant is in court and may
be examined and cross-examined in regard to his statements
and their subject matter. ,,12 But in giving this justification
for the rule, the Law Revision Commission was echoing the
9. People v. Bosby, 256 Cal. App.2d
209, 64 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1967).
10. See People v. Woodberry, 265
Cal. App.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr. 165
(1968).

11. 68 Ca1.2d 646, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599,
441 P.2d 111 (1968).
12. Comment to Cal. Evid. Code
§ 1235.
CAL LAW 1969
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supreme court itself. In People v. Gould 13 the court had
held that a pretrial identification, although hearsay, can be
admitted against a criminal defendant because "the principal
danger of admitting hearsay evidence is not present since
the witness is available at the trial for cross-examination."14
This rationale when used by the Law Revision Commission
obviously did not appeal to the court as much as it did when
conceived by the court itself. Yet, there seems little to distinguish the lohnson case substantively from the Gould case.
Gould involved a pretrial identification of two suspects by
a witness. At the trial, the witness did not testify that she
had previously identified the criminals. She said that she
was shown pictures and selected two that "looked similar
to the men who were in my apartment but not all the features
were the same."15 Her testimony at the trial was the same
insofar as one defendant was concerned, and in regard to the
other defendant the witness did not identify him at the trial.
The prosecution then introduced a police officer to testify
that the witness had made a positive identification of the
defendants from photographs. This, obviously, was inconsistent with her testimony that she had not made such a positive identification. In Gould, the court held the police officer's testimony admissible and justified its holding on the
ground that the identifying witness was present in court for
cross-examination. Yet, if the rationale of lohnson had been
applied, the lack of opportunity to cross-examine the identifying witness at the time of the identification should have resulted
in an exclusion of the identification testimony under the hearsay rule.
Evidence Code section 1238 provides a hearsay exception
for prior identification testimony, but only where the identifying witness testifies positively that he made a true identification on the prior occasion. The Gould case would not have
been saved by section 1238 of the Code, for in Gould the

13. 54 Cal.2d 621, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273,
354 P.2d 865 (1960).
14. 54 Cal.2d at 626, 7 Cal. Rptr. at
275, 354 P.2d at 867.
16
CAL LAW 1969

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/4

IS. 54 Cal.2d at 625, 7 Cal. Rptr. at
274-275, 354 P.2d at 866-867.
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identifying witness did not testify positively that the prior
identification was a correct identification. Insofar as Gould
states a broader rule than section 1238 of the Code, therefore,
it may be that People v. Johnson has overruled the Gould
decision. Whether it has or not will have to await further
decisions.
The scope of the new rule in Johnson is not altogether clear.
Apparently, the defendant can still use the prior inconsistent
statement of a witness as substantive evidence, because the
prosecution has no constitutional right of confrontation. 16
Apparently, where a witness gives damaging testimony against
the prosecution, the prosecution can use a prior inconsistent
statement to impeach the witness though the prosecution is
not surprised by the testimony. I? Although the courts in
other contexts have been critical of the efficacy of limiting
instructions,18 it is likely that a court must give an instruction
on a prior inconsistent statement limiting its consideration
to impeachment only.19
Where the inconsistent statement was given in testimony
at the preliminary hearing, application of Johnson has resulted
in a rather anomalous rule. Section 1291 of the Evidence
Code provides that testimony given in a previous hearing
or trial, where the defendant had an opportunity to fully
cross-examine the witness, is admissible against the defendant
at a subsequent trial if the witness is unavailable to testify
at that time. Under this exception, the testimony of a witness
at a preliminary hearing can be admitted at the trial if the
witness is no longer available 20 and the defendant, by counsel,
had a full opportunity to cross-examine at the preliminary
hearing. 1
16. See the suggestion in People v.
Stanley, 67 Cal.2d 812, 816, footnote 1,
63 Cal. Rptr. 825. 827, 433 P.2d 913,
915 (1968).
17. People v. Woodberry, 265 Cal.
App.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1968).
18. See Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123, 20 L.Ed.2d 476, 88 S.Ct. 1620
(1968).
19. The law as stated in People v
2
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Orcalles, 32 Cal.2d 562, 197 P.2d 26
(1948) probably remains unchanged in
the light of Johnson. People v. Odom,
265 A.C.A. 387,71 Cal. Rptr. 260 held
that such an instruction must be given,
but the Supreme Court vacated the
opinion by granting a hearing.
20. See Cal. Evid. Code § 240.

1. People v. Hernandez, 263 Cal.
App.2d 242, 69 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1968).
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The United States Supreme Court has recently added the
further limitation that if a preliminary hearing witness is incarcerated outside the state, the prosecution must show a
diligent effort to obtain his presence at the trial in order
that the defendant might confront and cross-examine the witness at the tria1. 2 Thus, where the preliminary hearing witness is entirely absent and there is no opportunity to question
him at the trial on the merits, his preliminary hearing testimony can be introduced as substantive evidence under section
1291. However, if the witness appears and testifies in a manner inconsistent with his preliminary hearing testimony, the
preliminary hearing testimony can be shown only for impeachment, and not as substantive evidence. 3 It seems strange that
the preliminary hearing testimony should be received as substantive evidence when there is no current opportunity to
cross-examine the witness, yet it cannot be received as substantive evidence when there is a current opportunity to crossexamine the witness. This. anomalous result suggests that
the courts may have gone too far in restricting the application of section 1235 against criminal defendants.4 As the
inconsistent statement is admissible anyway where the witness
gives testimony harmful to the prosecution,S and since the
courts seem to believe that limiting instructions have no substantive effect,6 it is difficult to see why it should be constitutionally necessary to give a limiting instruction forbidding the
2. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 20
L.Ed .2d 255, 88 S.Ct. 1318 (1968).
3. People v. Green, 70 A.C. 696, 75
Cal. Rptr 782, 451 P.2d 422 (1969).
The factual recitation by the Supreme
Court suggests that the preliminary
transcript could have been admitted as
substantive evidence under Cal. Evid.
Code § 1237 as recorded memory. The
Court did not, however, discuss this possibility. It may be that the "confrontation" objection to admissibility under
§ 1235 is also applicable to recorded
memory offered under § 1237. See
footnote 6 of the court's opinion. See
18

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/4

also People v Davis, infra footnote 8,
and the discussion relating thereto.
4. A more rational rule would be to
hold that § 1235 call be used against a
criminal defendant if the witness has
first given testimony damaging to the
prosecution's case or if the inconsistent
statement would be admissible under
§ 1291 were the witness unavailable at
the trial.
5. See People v. Woodberry, 265 Cal.
App.2d at - , 71 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
6. See Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123, 20 L.Ed.2d 476, 88 S.C!. 1620
(J 968).
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use of the prior statement as substantive evidence. 7 If the
courts are right and the limiting instruction does not have
any real effect, the only other rule which might be applied
rationally would be to forbid the prosecution from impeaching
the defendant's witnesses with their inconsistent pretrial statements. This, it is submitted, would withhold too much evidence from the trier of fact and would create too great a
possibility of misdetermination of the facts.
One further development in this area should be noted. In
People v. Davis B the court had occasion to apply the recorded
memory exception contained in section 1237. The case is
notable because the memory was that recorded by two individuals. One witness testified that she had made a true notation of a license number and read it to the other witness over
the phone. The other witness testified that he had made a
true recording of his telephone conversation, and he produced
his recorded note in court. His testimony as to the content
of his note was held admissible as recorded memory. Under
former law, of course, the document containing recorded
memory had to be made by or under the supervision of the
person witnessing the matter recorded in the document. The
Evidence Code made possible the admission of a memory
recorded by another.
Here again, the opportunity for cross-examining the witness
concerning the subject matter of his observation is totally
absent for he has no recollection of the matter he observed.
If confrontation is to be a bar to further developments of
the hearsay rule in criminal cases, perhaps the extension of
section 1237 to cooperatively recorded memory is also forbidden by the constitution.
State of Mind

The hearsay exception for statements of the declarant's
state of mind has been peculiarly troublesome for the California courts. Some of the problems are explored in the
7. See the discussion in People v.
Pierce, 269 A.C.A. 192, 269 Cal. App.
2d - , 75 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1969).

8. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr.
242 (1968).
CAL LAW 1969
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comments to the Evidence Code sections dealing with this
exception to the hearsay rule. 9 In 1968, this exception was
again before the court on a number of occasions. The principal case was People v. Lew. 10 This case, like People v.
Merkouris ll and People v. Hamilton 12 and several subsequent
court of appeal decisions, again concerned evidence of statements made by a murder victim relating threats made by the
defendant and other fear-engendering acts.
In Lew, the defendant and the victim were alone inside
his apartment. The victim was shot by a pistol owned by
the defendant. The defendant testified that the shooting
occurred accidentally. The prosecution introduced, over defense objection, remarks made by the victim stating that the
defendant had threatened to kill her. Some of the witnesses
testified, in addition, that the victim had stated that the defendant had threatened her parents, that the victim had stated
she feared the defendant, that the victim had stated that the
defendant had a terrible temper and went into rages, and
that the victim had stated that the defendant displayed a gun
to her and threatened to throw her rings into the ocean.
Some of the victim's statements reflected no more than her
attitude toward the defendant. Some of the statements, however, related threats and violent conduct on the part of the
defendant. The evidence was offered ostensibly to show the
victim's state of mind. It was the defendant's story that the
victim had asked to see the gun owned by the defendant
and, while she was handling it, the gun accidentally discharged. The prosecution offered the victim's state of mind
to show that the victim was afraid of the defendant, and it
asked the jury to infer that, because of her fear, she would
have been reluctant to handle a gun in the defendant's presence.
The supreme court agreed that the victim's fear of the
9. See comments to Cal. Evid. Code
1250-1252.
10. 68 Cal.2d 774, 69 Cal. Rptr. 102,
441 P.2d 942 (1968).
11. 52 Ca1.2d 672,344 P.2d 1 (1959)
20
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cert. den. 361 U.S. 943, 4 L.Ed.2d 364,
80 S.C!. 411, overruled on other grounds
66 C.2d 518.
12. 55 Cal.2d 881. 13 Cal. Rptr. 649.
362 P.2d 473 (1961).
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defendant was relevant to show her reluctance to handle a
gun in the defendant's presence. 13 Nevertheless, the court
held that the testimony concerning the victim's statements was
inadmissible. The court said that testimony to prove the
victim's state of mind is not admissible "if it refers solely
to alleged past conduct on the part of the accused." Moreover, such testimony is admissible only if there is "at least
circumstantial evidence that [the statements] are probably
trustworthy and credible." The court found that the victim's
statements related predominantly to conduct of the defendant,
and the court included among such conduct the defendant's
threats. Moreover, the court found that the victim had
motives for falsifying her fear of the defendant. Therefore,
under both criteria, her statements were inadmissible.
The Lew decision leaves in doubt the admissibility of a
victim's narration of threats made by the defendant. In
Hamilton, upon which the court relied, the court said that
statements of threats were admissible if they met the criteria
stated above. In Lew, the court states that the narration of
a threat is a narration of "past conduct" which is inadmissible.
We are left in doubt, therefore, under these cases, whether
the supreme court will admit a victim's narration of the defendant's threats to harm the victim when there is no evidence that the narration was not trustworthy, and when the
victim's state of mind is truly relevant to the later conduct of
the victim.
Two other cases dealing with this exception to the hearsay
rule point to possible defense use of this exception as it is
expressed in the Evidence Code. In People v. Farr l4 the defendant was on trial for killing his wife. The defendant
sought to introduce a long memorandum written prior to the
death in which he discussed his relationship with his wife.
The principal mood expressed was love and compassion and,
13. This asserted relevancy is extremely difficult to follow. If she were
afraid that the defendant might harm
her, it would seem more rational for
her to want possession of the gun both
to provide herself with self-protection
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and to deprive the defendant of a means
of harming her. Nevertheless. we accept the court's rationale for the purpose of discussion.
14. 255 Cal. App.2d 679, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 477 (1967).
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if sincere, it belied an intention to take her life. The trial
court ruled the document inadmissible. The appellate court
points out that, whereas some prior cases had held such a
document inadmissible because "self-serving," under the provisions of the Code, the document would be admissible to
show the declarant's state of mind at the time the document
was written and his state of mind for a reasonable time thereafter. Evidence of this state of mind would be properly
admissible because that state of mind had a vital bearing on
the gravity of the offense of which he was guilty. It was
pointed out, however, that the admissibility of the document
under section 1250 of the Code is subject to the requirement
of section 1252. Thus, the court should exclude the document if it was made under circumstances indicating its lack
of trustworthiness. The appellate court pointed out, though,
that the record of the first trial showed no evidence indicating
the insincerity of the document.
Another case, decided by the same court, is illustrative of
a proper application of section 1252. In People v. Cruz 15 the
defendant sought to introduce a tape of an interview with the
police after the crime had been committed in which he made
several exculpatory statements. The tape was offered under
Code section 1250 to show the then state of mind of the
declarant from which it was sought to be shown that the declarant's state of mind at or about the time of the crime was
inconsistent with his guilt. The appellate court found that
there were no indicia of trustworthiness surrounding the
making of the statement. The defendant had the strongest
possible motives for his exculpatory statement, even if false.
The lack of indicia of trustworthiness rendered the statement
inadmissible.
Character Evidence; Habit or Custom

The Evidence Code contains some new law on the admissibility of evidence relating to character. Under the Code
15. 264 Cal. App.2d - , 70 Cal. Rptr.
603 (1968).
22
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character evidence in the form of either reputation or opinion
is admissible on the issue of the credibility of a witness. A
criminal defendant may introduce evidence of his good character in the form of opinion or reputation evidence. The
prosecution may introduce similar evidence to show the bad
character of the criminal defendant if the criminal defendant
first introduces evidence of his good character. Where there
is a victim of the alleged crime, the defendant may introduce
character evidence consisting of reputation, opinion, or evidence of specific acts to show the bad character of the victim
and the likelihood that the victim behaved in accordance with
that character at the time in question.
Several of these rules came before the appellate courts
during 1968. In People v. Rowland 16 the defendant was convicted of an assault with a deadly weapon. The victim and the
defendant were riding in the victim's car, and were the only
persons in the car when the victim was shot. The defendant's version of the incident was that the victim was an aggressive pervert, and the gun accidentally discharged while the
defendant was warding off a homosexual advance by the
VIctIm. To establish this defense, the defendant offered to
show evidence of the victim's similar aggressions towards
third persons. The trial court excluded such evidence, but
the appellate court held that the exclusion was error. Under
section 1103 of the Evidence Code, evidence of such specific
acts is admissible to show the character of the victim of a
crime for the purpose of proving his conduct in conformity
with that character at the time of the alleged crime.
In People v. Ogi 7 defendant was prosecuted for murder.
The defendant offered character evidence to show his peaceful disposition. On. rebuttal, the prosecution presented two
witnesses who gave their opinion that the defendant was violent. Cross-examination developed that each witness knew
personally of but one violent incident. Nevertheless, when it
was shown that the witnesses had known the defendant intimately for many years, the court held their opinions admissible
16. 262 Cal. App.2d 790, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 269 (19tl3).
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and found that their knowledge of specific incidents went to
the weight of their opinions not to the admissibility.
An analagous problem relates to the admissibility of expert opinion evidence concerning the credibility of the prosecuting witness in sex cases. In People v. Russells the state
supreme court held that the trial court in a sex case may
order a prosecuting witness to submit to a psychiatric examination for the purpose of determining his or her credibility
"if the circumstances indicate a necessity therefor." The
court indicated that where the charge rests on the credibility
of a child as against the bare denial of of the defendant, the
trial court should exercise its discretion liberally in favor of
the defendant to permit the examining psychiatrist to give his
opinion on the credibility of the prosecuting witnesses. In
Russel, the conviction was reversed because of the exclusion
of the psychiatric evidence.
In People v. McJntyre 19 the court pointed out that a defendant must move for the appointment of a psychiatrist to
examine the prosecuting witness. If the defendant fails to
request a psychiatric examination for the prosecutrix, he is not
entitled to introduce psychiatric testimony impeaching the
prosecuting witness:
We hold that where a defendant wants to introduce
psychiatric testimony impeaching a prosecutrix in a sex
offense prosecution, he must request the trial court to
exercise its discretion, to determine, inter alia, whether
the need for psychiatric testimony about the credibility
of the prosecutrix outweighs the danger of such testimony,
and to order the prosecutrix to submit to psychiatric
examination. 20
Closely related to character evidence, and sometimes confused with it, is evidence of habit or custom. The confusion
possibly lies in the terms that are used to describe the traits
18. 69 Cal.2d 187,70 Cal. Rptr. 210,
443 P.2d 794 (1968). For further discuss ion of this case, see Collings,
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, in this
volume.
24
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256 Cal. App.2d 894, 64 Cal.
530 (1967).
256 Cal. App.2d at 900, 64 Cal.
at 534-535.
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involved. The word "character" seems to connote some moral
quality, yet for evidentiary purposes this is not what is intended. What the Evidence Code refers to as "character" is
simply the general disposition or propensity of a person to
engage in a certain type of conduct. On the other hand, the
Code's reference to "habit" contemplates a regular response
to a repeated specific situation. 1 The confusion that sometimes arises is illustrated by the first opinion in People v.
Gaines. 2 In that case the trial court rejected a defense offer
of proof that it was the arresting officer's long standing policy
to make any conceivable narcotics arrest in spite of highly
tenuous grounds for probable cause in order to remove any
suspected contraband narcotics from circulation. The appellate court stated that the trial court properly excluded the evidence because of the collateral issues which it would have
raised, but suggested that the evidence was relevant to show
habit or custom in order to prove conduct on a specified occasion in conformity with the habit or custom. It is doubtful that
this type of conduct can properly be called "habit". It seems
to fit more nearly within the description of "character"-the
evidence related to the officer's propensity for making arrests
on inadequate cause. As pointed out by McCormick,3 "a habit
is a person's regular practice of meeting a particular
kind of situation with a specific type of conduct, such as the
habit of going down a particular stairway two stairs at a time,
or of giving a hand-signal for a left turn, or of alighting from
railway cars while they are moving. The doing of the habitual
acts may become semi-automatic." As a matter of fact, one
might add that habitual acts usually are semi-automatic, and
many times a person will not be conscious of his performance
of the habitual act. 4 It should be apparent, therefore, that an
1. See comment to Cal. Evid. Code
1105. See also McCormick, Evidence,
pages 340-341.
2. 265 Cal. App.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr.
468 (1968). The first opinion in the
case appears at 67 Cal. Rptr. 159.
3. McCormick, Evidence at page 341.
4. "Habit is a product of acquisition.
§
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In this respect it differs from instinct,
with which otherwise it has much in
common. We say we do a thing from
habit, e. g., nod back when a person
not recognized nods to us, when as a
consequence of long practice and frequent repetition the action has become
in a measure organized, and thus shorn
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officer's determination of probable cause for a narcotics arrest
is not likely to become so habitual that it can become semiautomatic and performed below the level of full consciousness.
Far more likely, an officer's propensity for making arrests
reflects just that-his propensity or "character" for arresting
narcotics violators upon insufficient evidence. The appellate
court may have recognized that its discussion of this aspect of
the case was deficient, for a rehearing was granted and the
discussion of habit evidence was omitted from the ultimate
opinion in the case.
Evidence of Other Crimes

The Evidence Code continued the prior law that evidence
of specific acts of misconduct, including evidence of the commission of other crimes, is inadmissible to prove the propensity
of a defendant to commit the crime with which he is charged.
Nevertheless, evidence of other crimes is admissible where relevant to show some other fact.
A frequent use of evidence of other crimes committed by
the defendant is to show a distinctive method by which the
defendant performs such acts. By identifying the same distinctive methods in the crime charged, the prosecution then
is able to argue that the charged crime must also have been
committed by the defendant. In People v. Haston 5 the defendant was charged with robbery. The prosecution introduced evidence of prior robberies committed by the defendant
in an effort to demonstrate that he committed the robbery
charged as well. The supreme court pointed out several
features that were common to both the prior crimes and the
charged crime. Nevertheless, the court held that these common features were not "of that distinctive nature necessary to
of some of its original appanage of full
consciousness or attention. The characteristic note of habit is mechanicality
the oft-repeated becomes
habitual and so automatic because the
nervous centers engaged have taken on
special modifications, have, according to
the customary physiological figure, be26
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come 'seamed' by special lines of discharge." 2 Sully, The Human Mind,
224 (1892) excerpts from quotations in
Wigmore, Science of Judicial Proof,
127, 128 (3d ed., 1937).
5. 69 Cal.2d 233, 70 Cal. Rptr. 419,
444 P.2d 91 (1968).
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raise a logical inference that the perpetrators of the prior
offenses
were the perpetrators of the charged offenses." The common features were common to many armed
robberies, and to permit such evidence to be received would be
to authorize the conviction of the defendant merely because
he had been proved to have been a robber on prior occasions.
The court went further, however, and pointed out that a common feature of all of the crimes, including the crime charged,
was the identity of the other participant in the crime. "There
is only one [D.M.] and his conjunction with defendant in
earlier robberies, together with his admitted participation in
the robberies charged, supports the inference that defendant
and not some other person was his accomplice in those charged
offenses. "6
It sometimes becomes appropriate to introduce evidence of
other crimes in sex cases. For example, in People v. McIntyre,7 evidence of uncharged sex offenses was introduced
in order to show the lack of the defendant's innocent intent
in engaging in the conduct charged and to show his lustful
intent in such conduct. Evidence of other not too remote
sex crimes against the prosecuting witness has been held admissible to show a lewd disposition or the intent of the defendant towards the prosecuting witness. s In People v. Stanley 9
the supreme court announced a limitation on this rule permitting the admission of uncharged crimes in sex cases.
Where proof of the crime itself depends upon the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecuting witness, and the prior
crimes are also sought to be proved by the uncorroborated
testimony of the prosecuting witness, the supreme court held
that the evidence of the prior crimes is inadmissible. Said
the court, "the cases establish that where the basic issue of
the case is the veracity of the prosecuting witness and the
6. 69 Cal.2d at 249, 70 Cal. Rptr. at
430, 444 P.2d at 102. People v. Cavanaugh, 69 Cal.2d 262, 70 Cal. Rptr.
438, 444 P.2d 110 (1968) is to the same
effect.
7. 256 Cal. App.2d 894, 64 Cal. Rptr.
530 (1967).

8. See the discussion in People v.
Stanley, 67 Cal.2d 812, 63 Cal. Rptr.
825, 433 P .2d 913 (1967).
9. 67 Ca1.2d 812, 63 Cal. Rptr. 825,
433 P.2d 913 (1967).
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defendant as to the commission of the acts charged, the trier
of fact is not aided by evidence of other offenses where that
evidence is limited to the uncorroborated testimony of the
prosecuting witness."lo There was the additional factor in the
Stanley case that the prosecuting witness was substantially impeached-the court said that the witness' recitation of prior
misconduct by the defendant against the witness added nothing
to the credibility of the testimony concerning the charged
crime.
In People v. lackson ll the court was involved with another
aspect of the problem. There the other crimes sought to be
proved did not relate to the defendant's conduct but related
to the conduct of the defendant's co-conspirator. The other
crimes were offered to show the co-conspirator's intent in engaging in the acts. Since the defendant was aiding and
abetting the co-conspirator in performing these acts, that intent would be imputed to the defendant as an aider and abettor.
The court rejected this rationale because it considered it unfair for the defendant to have the burden of proving his coconspirator's innocence of the uncharged crimes.
The court misstated the issue somewhat. Of course, the
defendant does not have the burden of proving anyone's innocence. The burden is on the prosecution to prove the coconspirator's intent, and that burden remains with the prosecution. What the court meant is that it is unfair to expect
the defendant to meet the prosecution's evidence of his coconspirator's uncharged crimes. Nevertheless, since the
crucial element in the case was the intent with which the coconspirator and the defendant were doing the acts they were
engaged in, the rule prohibiting the admission of uncharged
crimes seems unduly stultifying if that evidence is relevant
to prove the co-conspirator's intent. A similar argument could
be made against any other evidence relating to the co-conspira tor's acts or intent. The problem is not limited to the
situation before the court; it is inherent whenever the criminal
responsibility of one individual is based on the conduct of an10. 67 Cal.2d at 817, 63 Cal. Rptr.
at 827-828, 433 P.2d at 915-916.
28
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other. There seems to be no special reason to bar the prosecution from presenting evidence relevant to prove the acts or
intent of one party to a conspiracy in only those cases where
the evidence shows he committed an uncharged crime.
Search and Seizure

The major new development in the search and seizure cases
was the holding in People v. Sesslin 12 that a complaint "on
information and belief" is insufficient to support a valid arrest
warrant unless the facts underlying the belief are also alleged
and the magistrate determines that such facts support the complainant's belief. Hence, an arrest based on such a warrant is
an illegal arrest, and evidence seized incident to such an arrest
is inadmissible. A complaint alleging the commission of a
crime on information and belief may be adequate if the complaint alleges sufficient facts to show the commission of the
crime by the person whose arrest is sought and the reliability
of the information and credibility of its source. The complaint found inadequate in Sesslin did not relate any facts
which would support the complainant's belief that the defendant had committed the crime charged and did not state
any facts relating to the identity or credibility of the source of
the complainant's information. Accordingly, the complaint
was found inadequate.
As a general rule, a police officer may not forcibly enter
property pursuant to a search warrant unless he has announced his authority and purpose and is refused admittance. 13
However, if there are facts known to the officer before his
entry sufficient to support his good faith belief that such an
announcement would increase his peril or frustrate the purpose of the warrant, he may force an entry without an announcement. 14 In People v. Gastelo 16 the court held that it
could not authorize forced entry without announcement in
12. 68 Cal.2d 418, 67 Cal. Rptr. 409,
439 P.2d 321 (1968).
13. Cal. Penal Code § 1531.

14. People v. Gastelo, 67 C.2d 586,
63 Cal. Rptr. 10, 432 P.2d 706 (1967).
15. 67 Cal.2d 586, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10,
432 P.2d 706 (1967).
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all narcotics cases. 16 Particularized justification for an unannounced, forcible entry into the property to be searched
must be shown before the evidence obtained can be used.
In People v. Wohlleben 17 the defendant was arrested upon
three traffic warrants. During the booking process, he was
routinely searched, and marijuana was found. At the later
prosecution for the possession of the marijuana, the prosecution attempted to establish the admissibility of the marijuana
evidence by showing the legality of the arrest and subsequent
search. To prove the legality of the arrest, the prosecution
called one of the arresting officers to testify to the traffic warrants. He testified that he had seen telegraphic copies or
abstracts of the traffic warrants at the police station. The defendant objected to this testimony on the ground of the best
evidence rule. The trial court overruled the objection, but
the appellate court properly reversed the trial court. Evidence Code sections 1500 and 1506 forbid the admission of
any evidence of the content of a public writing (the warrants
in this case) other than the writing itself or a copy. Testimony as to the content of a copy of a public writing is not
admissible under normal circumstances. IS

Parol Evidence Rule
The major development in the civil cases during 1968 is
found in three supreme court cases dealing with the parol
evidence rule. In Masterson v. Sine l9 the court abandoned
the rule that had been stated in some prior cases that whether
a written agreement was intended to be the entire agreement
between the parties is to be determined solely from the face
of the instrument. The court found that this strict formulation of the parol evidence rule had never been consistently applied. The court pointed out that the Restatement of Contracts would authorize proof of a collateral agreement if it
16. Cf. People v. De Leon, 260 Cal.
App.2d 143, 67 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1968).
17. 261 Cal. App.2d 461, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 826 (1968).
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18. See Cal. Evid. Code § 1508.
19. 68 Cal.2d 222, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545,
436 P.2d 561 (1968).
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"is such an agreement as might naturally be made as a separate
agreement by parties situated as were the parties to the written
contract.,,20 The draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code
would exclude oral evidence only if the additional terms are
such that, if agreed upon, they would certainly have been included in the document.
In Masterson, the court was dealing with a conveyance of a
ranch reserving to the grantors an option to purchase the
property back again. The question was whether the option
was personal to the grantors or whether it could be assigned.
The document was silent. The court held that evidence was
admissible to show that the option was not assignable, and
reversed the ruling of the trial court which had excluded such
evidence.
In Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Company! the court was dealing with an indemnity clause in a contract. One party offered evidence
to show that the indemnity clause was meant to cover injury
to property of third parties only and not to property of the
contracting parties. Here the court stated that the test of
admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of
a written contract is not whether the contract appears to the
court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether
the offered language is relevant to prove a meaning to which
the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible. The
court stated that rational interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to prove
the intention of the parties. The trial court was found to have
erroneously refused to consider extrinsic evidence to show
the meaning of the indemnity clause.
The final case dealing with the parol evidence rule is
Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arioto.2 Here, the plaintiff and the
defendant had entered into a contract by which the defendant
agreed to purchase and sell 50,000 locks from the plaintiff
20. Restatement of Contracts, § 240
(I)(b).
1. 69 Cal.2d 33, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561,
442 P.2d 641 (1968).
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during the first year of the contract, and not less than 100,000
locks during the remaining years of the contract. The contract provided that if the defendant failed to distribute the
minimum number of locks to be distributed by it, the agreement was subject to termination by the plaintiff on 30 days'
notice. The defendant failed to purchase and sell the requisite
number of locks. The plaintiff terminated the contract and
sued for damages. The defendant offered evidence to show
that termination of the contract was the plaintiff's sole remedy.
The supreme court held that the language of the contract
was reasonably susceptible of the meaning contended for by
the defendant. Accordingly, the trial court committed prejudicial error by excluding extrinsic evidence offered to prove
the meaning of the termination clause. The court said that
such evidence would be admissible to show that the parties
had in fact intended to make termination the sole remedy.
Presumptions

In People v. lohnson 3 the court considered certain presumptions created by Penal Code section 270, which provides
that it is a misdemeanor for a father to willfully fail, without
lawful excuse, to provide for the support and maintenance
of his minor children. It further provides that proof of abandonment or desertion of a child by the father, or the omission
by the father to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter, or
medical assistance, is "prima facie" evidence that the abandonment or desertion or failure to provide necessary care is willful and without lawful excuse. Under the Evidence Code,
this provision creates a rebuttable presumption. 4 The defendant argued that it is unconstitutional to create such a presumption, but his argument was rejected by the court.
Section 270 of the Penal Code also provides that if the
father fails to provide for his children and remains out of
the state for 30 days during such violation he is gUilty of a
felony. Proof of the omission by the father to provide neces-

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/4

3. 258 Cal. App.2d 705, 66 Cal. Rptr.
99 (1968).
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sary care for more than 30 days, under the statute, is prima
facie evidence that the father was outside the state. This provision, said the court, is unconstitutional. There is no rational
connection between the omission of a father to provide for
his children for 30 days and his location at the time of such
omISSIon. Inasmuch as there is no rational connection between the proven fact giving rise to the presumption and the
presumed fact, the presumption was held unconstitutional.
Privileges

In Carlton v. Superior Court 5 the plaintiff in a personal injury action was seeking to obtain hospital records pertaining
to the defendant to show that the defendant was under the
influence of alcohol. The superior court agreed with the
plaintiff's contention that the defendant, by denying liability,
had tendered the issue of his condition and thus waived his
physician-patient privilege. The appellate court disagreed.
Said the court, "it seems clear that in an action for damages
for personal injuries the issues are 'tendered' by the plaintiff
within the meaning of section 996 of the Evidence Code, by
plaintiff's factual allegations as to such things as defendant's conduct (intoxication, etc.), and not by defendant's
denial of such allegations which constitutes no more than
a joinder of issue." The defendant did not tender his condition by denying liability and, therefore, did not waive the
physician-patient privilege. Accordingly, the plaintiff was
not entitled to discover the hospital records for they were protected by the defendant's physician-patient privilege.
In the same case the trial court indicated that it would look
at the hospital records to determine which of those records
were protected by the privilege and which were not. The
appellate court pointed out that Evidence Code section 915
forbids the determination of the applicability of the physicianpatient privilege by this procedure. A judge may not require disclosure of information claimed to be privileged in
order to rule on the claim of privilege unless the privilege in5. 261 Cal. App.2d 282, 67 Cal. Rptr.
568 (1968).
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volved is the official information,6 identity of informer,7 or
trade secret privilege. B
In Richards v. Superior Court,9 the court seems to have read
a substantive meaning into section 1040 of the Evidence
Code that was not intended by its authors. The case involved
a plaintiff in a personal injury action who had previously made
a claim for disability insurance benefits under the Unemployment Insurance Code. In connection with that claim, which
arose out of the same occurrence involved in the personal
injury action, the department of employment referred the
plaintiff to a physician, who submitted a report of his findings
to the department.
The plaintiff thereafter signed a document authorizing the
doctor to release the records of his examination to the defendants' attorney, whereupon defendants attempted to subpoena the doctor and his records for a discovery deposition.
The department of employment moved to quash the subpoena,
and the court granted the motion, on the ground that the
records were privileged.
All parties conceded that the Unemployment Insurance
Code created a privilege. The only question was whether it
had been waived by a person authorized to do so. The defendant relied on Crest Catering Co. v. Superior Court 10
which had held that the person reporting to the department can
waive the privilege created by the Unemployment Insurance
Code. The court in Richards distinguished the Crest Catering
decision on the grounds that it was decided before enactment
of the Evidence Code and that the privilege was invoked
in Crest by the person reporting, not the department. The
opinion suggests that the enactment of the Code made the
privilege absolute and not subject to waiver by the person
reporting.
It is unlikely that the Evidence Code was intended to
have any effect on statutory privileges created by other codes.
6. Cal. Evid. Code § 1040.
7. Cal. Evid. Code § 1041.
8. Cal. Evid. Code § 1060.
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Rptr. 917 (1968).
10. 62 Cal.2d 274, 42 Cal. Rptr.
110, 398 P.2d 150 (1965).
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Evidence Code section 1040, upon which Richards relies,
merely recognizes the existence of other statutory privileges,
it does not purport to modify them. If a statute creating a
privilege permitted waiver of the privilege prior to the Evidence Code, there is no reason to believe the statute would
not permit a similiar waiver after enactment of the Code.
Section 1040 states merely that "official information" is privileged if "disclosure is forbidden by . . . a statute of this
state." If such a statute permits waiver under certain circumstances, therefore, disclosure under those circumstances
is not forbidden by the statute. If Crest Catering held that
the statute permits waiver by the person reporting, it would
follow that the statute would still permit such waiver after
enactment of the Evidence Code. As pointed out in
Richards, however, Crest Catering did not involve a claim of
privilege by the department itself. Therefore, it held only
that the person reporting could effectively waive his own
privilege under the statute. Richards involved a claim of
privilege by the department, and it holds that the department's right to claim the privilege cannot be waived by the
person reporting. The holding must be based, however, on
the Unemployment Insurance Code, not upon some additional
force given to that code by the Evidence Code.
Judicial Notice

In People v. M(lcLaird,ll the court, relying on section 451
of the Evidence Code, held that the principles underlying
radar are so universally known that a court must take judicial
notice of the accuracy of radar as a speed measuring device.
Of course, the installation, accuracy, and operation of a particular radar machine cannot be judicially noticed; those
facts must be established by competent evidence.
Conclusion

The courts for the most part have continued to accept and
apply the Evidence Code with enthusiasm and understanding.
11. 264 Cal. App.2d -,71 Cal. Rptr.
191 (1968).
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In a few instances, they have shown a tendency to apply
broadened rules of admissibility only against the prosecution
in criminal cases, finding constitutional objections to broadened rules of admissibility against defendants. It remains
to be seen whether these are isolated instances involving
specific problems or whether the cases indicate a trend.
It is clear, however, that the initiative for change in the
law of evidence has once more been assumed by the courts.
In exercising this initiative, it is to be hoped that they will
not consider specific problems in isolation from the whole
law of evidence for such an approach can only lead to the
creation of the anomalies and anachronisms that prompted the
enactment of the Code.
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